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Abstract This paper addresses the governance of the ‘live-work mix’. This concept refers to the renewed 
intertwining of living and working activities in new housing and urban development in the context of welfare 
state restructuring, development of the knowledge economy and globalisation. Implementing live-work 
goals can be difficult because a consensus between public and private actors is usually needed to develop 
such projects. In this paper, we examine the actors and instruments that assist in the implementation of live-
work goals in targeted areas. We survey live-work development by analysing three illustrative projects in 
Brussels and Amsterdam, cities with comparable strategies but distinct planning systems. Our results 
indicate that state support is essential to enhance live-work mix, especially because the market remains 
reluctant to mix functions and focuses primarily on housing development. Flexible and tailor-made 
instruments are used, sometimes co-authored by public and private actors, to reach consensus. These 
instruments illustrate variants of strategic planning. Despite a shared interest in attracting target groups to 
redevelopment areas, the consensus-building process is affected by discrepancies in the nature of live-work 
mix. 
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1 Introduction  
This paper addresses the governance of the ‘live-work mix’, a concept that refers to the intertwining of 
living and working activities (including manufacturing and service-oriented economic activities) in new 
urban developments. Before being separated under functionalist principles, housing and economic activities 
were intimately interdependent (Madden & Marcuse, 2016). With the ‘flexibilisation’ of labour markets, the 
distinction between the work and home spheres has once again become increasingly blurred (Bergan et al., 
2020). Nowadays, various forms of live-work buildings do exist, including housing over commercial ground 
floors and mixed-use live-work neighbourhoods (Dolan, 2012). Live-work mix is seen as a particular form 
of mixed-use development that ranges from the building to the district scale (Hoppenbrouwer & Louw, 
2005). The demand for more flexible workplaces and housing has led to new urban developments (Healey, 
1997) with governance implications that may vary across contexts. Hence, this paper focuses on the actors 
and instruments involved in developments that mix housing and economic activities (both industrial and 
service-oriented) at diverse scales in redevelopment areas of different cities.  
Current forms of live-work mix were developed in the context of welfare state restructuring, development 
of the knowledge economy and the globalisation of cities (Sassen, 1991). Live-work mix came to be seen as 
instrumental to economic growth and competitiveness, and local governments soon began to advocate for 
such developments (Grant & Perrott, 2011). In particular, both the creation of attractive live-work 
environments and the more recent emergence of ‘live-work-play’ concepts (Dolan, 2012) were promoted in 
obsolete office and industrial areas. Such supports were part of a strategy to attract highly skilled workers 
in knowledge-intensive sectors (e.g. Bontje & Musterd, 2009; Hansen & Niedomysl, 2009), especially in 
post-industrial cities, but it came at the expense of affordable housing (Ferm & Jones, 2016). Introducing 
housing into these former ‘employment lands’ has been used as a ‘regeneration catalyst’ since the 1990s 
(ibid.). Other approaches seek to enhance innovative forms of active production, urban manufacturing and 
logistics within cities, following recent planners’ discourses on the ‘productive city’, the ‘city of making’ or 
the ‘productive democracy’ (Baudouin, 2010; De Boeck et al., 2017; Pecqueur, 2006). Today, despite the 
difficulties associated with live-work developments, such approaches are becoming more widespread in 
urban development agendas.  
Implementing live-work goals can be difficult because this involves different kinds of public and private 
actors—with overlapping interests—who need to build consensus. Such collaborative efforts in governance 
(Healey, 1997) have become increasingly complex and entail improved understanding (Tasan-Kok et al., 
2019). Existing planning frameworks constrain collaborative governance. Such governance requires new 
roles for the actors and new planning instruments, such as tailor-made contractual arrangements (van den 
Hurk & Tasan-Kok, 2020). Much of the research on mixed-use development has focused on single contexts 
(Grant, 2002; Hoppenbrouwer & Louw, 2005; Korthals Altes & Tambach, 2008; Mualam et al., 2019), 
whereas comparative case study research is needed to address variations in local governance arrangements 
(Bassett et al., 2002) and the influence of different institutional contexts.  
The purpose of this paper is to explore the governance of live-work mix, especially the actors and 
instruments that promote the implementation of live-work goals in targeted areas within contrasting 
institutional frameworks. More specifically, we seek to answer the question: what is the impact of local 
institutional frameworks on live-work development? In particular, which actors and instruments make such 
developments possible? In what follows, we survey the development of the live-work mix in Brussels and 
Amsterdam. These cities have similar live-work mix strategies, but differences in implementation have 
produced differing housing tenures and economic activities. These differences are reflected in distinct 
housing and planning systems and specific development discourses. After introducing the analytical 
framework used to examine the governance of the ‘live-work mix’, we provide a brief background of each 
city’s institutional context and live-work mix strategy. Then, we introduce our comparative, embedded case 
study analysis, which we use to compare the actors and instruments in three illustrative live-work projects, 
one located in a former office area in Amsterdam, and the other two in a former industrial area in Brussels. 
2 Governance of live-work mix  
2.1 Instrumentation of live-work mix  
Live-work mix and, more broadly, mixed-use developments, have become essential principles in urban 
policy, especially since the new charter of Athens in 1998 (Hoppenbrouwer & Louw, 2005) and the North-
American ‘New Urbanism’ and ‘Smart Growth’ movements (Ferm & Jones, 2016). Mixed-use developments 
emphasise the efficient integration of diverse uses—especially in well-connected locations (Grant, 2002; 
Grant & Perrott, 2011)—as well as higher-quality built environments with improved social control (Cozens, 
2008; Hoppenbrouwer & Louw, 2005; Louw & Bruinsma, 2006; Mualam et al., 2019). Although local 
planners have advocated mixed-use to enhance social integration and economic development, such 
developments have been associated with increased segregation and little improvement of economic vitality 
(Grant, 2002; Novak, 2019). Residential-led mixed-use developments have been criticised for creating 
vacancies in other uses (Korthals Altes, 2019) and for displacing the remaining industries—seen as 
incompatible with housing—in post-industrial cities, hence fuelling unemployment in manufacturing (Ferm 
& Jones, 2016). Moreover, the tension between ‘liveability for all’ and investment value can lead to 
affordability issues (Korthals Altes, 2019, p. 1153). Despite these drawbacks, live-work mix remains a central 
aspect of urban development strategies.  
Nevertheless, the implementation of live-work goals faces numerous barriers. Cultural and economic forces 
promote the separation of uses and the segregation of markets, leading to separate housing and job clusters 
(Dolan, 2012; Grant & Perrott, 2011; Healey, 1997; Hoppenbrouwer & Louw, 2005). At the building level, 
public ground floors are often requested, but they involve complex joint ownership arrangements with 
multiple stakeholders (Mualam et al., 2019; Winston, 2007). These barriers generate planning uncertainties, 
especially in the case of urban regeneration (van den Hurk & Tasan-Kok, 2020). These uncertainties have 
been exacerbated by the global financial crisis, which has led to an emphasis on public–private partnerships 
and the emergence of new real estate actors (ibid). 
2.2 An institutionalist approach to governance of live-work mix  
The analytical framework we have adopted draws upon an institutionalist approach to collaborative 
governance (Healey, 1997). It focuses on the governance arrangements used to build consensus on live-
work goals and their implementation process (Gonzalez & Healey, 2005). This approach is suitable for 
multi-stakeholder developments, such as live-work projects. In this approach, governance corresponds to 
‘a coordination process of actors, social groups and institutions to reach goals discussed and defined 
collectively’ (Lascoumes & Le Galès, 2012, p. 23; author’s translation). Similarly, governance capacity refers to 
the ability of institutions to operate as a collective actor (Gonzalez & Healey, 2005; Lascoumes & Le Galès, 
2012). In each institutional context, we examine the roles of the actors and the instruments they use to reach 
consensus and implement live-work goals. The different steps of the analytical framework are illustrated in 
Fig. 1.  
 
 
Fig. 1. Analytical framework for governance arrangements that foster consensus on live-work goals and their implementation. 
 
With the restructuring of housing provision and the globalisation of cities, new actors and roles have arisen in 
the housing market (Aalbers, 2008; Fahey & Norris, 2011; Nappi-Choulet, 2012). The state is no longer a 
single entity, but a ‘specific institutional ensemble with multiple boundaries’ and ‘intersecting relations’ 
(Gonzalez & Healey, 2005, p. 2058). In this paper, the state refers to public entities that depend on the local 
government, which is seen as a ‘flexible institutional actor’ and an ‘active negotiating party’ (Castells, 2002; 
Tasan-Kok, 2010). States can alternately play steering, facilitating and entrepreneurial roles in the 
implementation of live-work goals, depending on their governance capacity (Tasan-Kok, 2010). The 
facilitating role consists of supporting the market with resources, such as incentives, and assisting it in 
development and investment decisions (Heurkens et al., 2018; Nyström et al., 2014). Steering expands the 
state’s capacity to take a guiding role through such means as interaction and persuasion (B´eal et al., 2018). 
Beyond guiding and derisking the market, the state can also play an entrepreneurial role by envisioning risks 
and acting effectively, including investing in new specific areas or in ‘flagship projects’ (Tasan-Kok, 2010) 
to achieve policy goals (Korthals Altes, 2019). In the latter case, the state and market are no longer 
adversaries because state actions help create/support markets (Mazzucato, 2013). Irrespective of its role, 
state intervention is necessary to allow markets to work efficiently (Korthals Altes, 2019). Market parties 
have been playing more proactive roles in urban development, including opportunistic and strategic roles 
(Koppenjan, 2015; Tasan-Kok, 2010; Theurillat et al., 2015), to respond to existing demand and compete 
with new products (Theurillat et al., 2015). In multi-actor processes such as live-work projects, states and 
market parties have shifting and often conflicting interests (Tasan-Kok, 2010). In addition, their roles can 
overlap, for example, when they both engage in opportunistic behaviours (Koppenjan & Enserink, 2009). 
New actors, such as ‘innovation intermediaries’, who facilitate innovation, transfer knowledge and intervene 
between these traditional actors, are needed as support (Nyström et al., 2014).  
Thus, the actors involved in live-work projects are mutually dependent and use (new) instruments strategically 
throughout the implementation of live-work mix. Such strategic and collaborative planning implies 
consensus-building (Albrechts, 2004). At the city level, the urban development strategy or city plan is the 
main instrument formalising collective live-work goals. City plans have been increasingly used to enhance 
economic growth in dedicated areas and are often the outcome of tense negotiations between public and 
private actors (Pinson in Lascoumes & Le Galès, 2005). Similarly, large-scale urban projects are strategically 
used to build consensus among actors with conflicting visions (Bassett et al., 2002). The political goals of 
this ‘coalition-building’ process, built on shared visions and discourses, are nevertheless difficult to achieve 
(Salet, 2008). Locally, planning instruments help balance flexibility against legal certainty because they stabilise 
collective action, balance conflicting objectives and pressures and increase both the transparency and 
predictability of actors’ behaviours (Buitelaar & Sorel, 2010; Remøy & Street, 2018). The flexibility of 
processes and mindsets is key to successful governance (Müller et al., 2014). Instruments that are too 
predictable can be resistant to change (van Bueren & ten Heuvelhof, 2005). In our case, such predictability 
could be seen as a barrier to innovative live-work mix. Flexibility can be enhanced through ‘design-oriented’ 
planning, which brings together visions, concepts and designs (Tasan-Kok, 2010). However, land-use 
regulation retains an important role in live-work development. Live-work mix is often made possible by 
changing land-use plans to allow housing development. In particular, such land-use changes have 
contributed to housing speculation in former industrial areas (Ferm & Jones, 2016) and have been associated 
with industrial gentrification (De Boeck et al., 2019). Other regulatory instruments include development 
contracts, which formalise public–private negotiations (van den Hurk & Tasan-Kok, 2020) and allow 
derisking of the market while safeguarding public services (Tasan-Kok et al., 2019). Public revenues are 
noticeably increased by value capture instruments, whether direct (e.g. public leaseholds in the Netherlands) 
or indirect (e.g. urbanisation charges in Brussels) (Alterman, 2012). All of these instruments play a role in 
the implementation of live-work mix. 
3 Live-work mix in Amsterdam and Brussels: local drivers and strategies  
We compare the governance arrangements of live-work mix in two contrasting institutional contexts: 
Amsterdam and Brussels. Historically, the Netherlands welfare state regime has been social democratic, 
whereas that of Belgium has been corporatist (Hoekstra, 2005). Amsterdam is an actively-planned city that 
is affected by the relaxation and flexibilisation of its regulations. Conversely, Brussels (referring here to the 
Brussels Capital Region) is a fragmented city that has long been affected by the absence of spatial planning 
policy (De Decker, 2008). Brussels is now committed to more active planning, but the complexity of its 
institutional setting and competition with peripheral areas hamper its governance capacity. In the sections 
below, we describe these contextual characteristics and their implications for live-work mix.  
3.1 Amsterdam  
Amsterdam’s live-work goals are primarily driven by the city’s desire to increase its housing supply and 
attract middle-income households. Amsterdam is a rapidly growing city where housing accessibility and 
affordability have become critical issues, especially for middle-income groups who are ineligible for social 
housing (40% of the housing stock) or mortgages and cannot afford privately rented dwellings (Boelhouwer, 
2019; Kadi & Musterd, 2015). To address these issues, the Housing Agenda 2025 (Woonagenda 2025) includes 
recommendations for low- and middle-income households. Specifically, the so-called ‘policy 40/40/20’ 
(2017) for new developments sets a distribution goal of 40% social housing, 40% mid-rental housing and 
20% free-market housing. In this policy, mid-rental housing refers to dwellings larger than 50 m2 with a 
monthly rent between 725€ and 1000€ (Amsterdamse federatie van woningcorporaties [AFWC], 2018). This 
tenure form is emphasised in redevelopment areas.  
A second important driver of the live-work mix in Amsterdam is the historical utilisation of spatial planning 
to foster economic growth (Terhorst & van de Ven, 2001). The city’s development has been marked by the 
Dutch tradition of active spatial planning and its evolution towards relaxation and flexibilisation. The city 
owns over 80% of the land, which is leased through a specific instrument: the land-lease contract (erfpacht) 
(Savini et al., 2016). In the early 2000s, industrial areas were opened to mixed-use development, and housing 
was utilised to improve the attractiveness of these areas for service-based activities (Korthals Altes & 
Tambach, 2008). Planning regulations were initially intended to limit property owners’ rights through 
detailed land-use plans, which had a steering function of encouraging the desired land uses and a 
safeguarding function of providing material legal certainty (Buitelaar & Sorel, 2010; Healey, 2007). However, 
regulatory changes since the 2008 crisis have prioritised market interests (Savini, 2016) by shortening 
procedures and reducing risks for the market (Remøy & Street, 2018). Further reforms were consistent with 
planning relaxation and flexibilisation (Heurkens et al., 2018; Savini, 2016). In particular, land-use plans have 
allowed new functions and increased land values (Remøy & Street, 2018). These recent developments have 
reduced the steering capacity of Dutch municipalities, giving local governments less room to manoeuvre 
(Heurkens et al., 2018).  
Currently, the Structural Vision for Amsterdam (Structuurvisie Amsterdam 2040) advocates densification 
through mixed-use development with amenities. This vision was a response to land scarcity, lack of social 
control in sensitive areas and the need to increase the housing supply (Bontje et al., 2017; Hochstenbach, 
2017; Savini, 2016). Accordingly, the Amsterdam 2025 strategy (Koers 2025) designates so-called ‘working-
living’ milieus in former harbour, industrial and office areas. In these zones, mixed-use development is 
promoted, and creative/ knowledge industries are stimulated (Bontje & Musterd, 2009). Thus, live-work 
mix is instrumental in the redevelopment of these areas. Nevertheless, enhancing the attractiveness of 
redevelopment areas is challenging, especially in post-war neighbourhoods that have been physically and 
socially segregated (Savini et al., 2016; see project AMS1).  
3.2 Brussels  
As in Amsterdam, Brussels’ live-work vision relies on attracting middle-income households. Brussels suffers 
from social and economic fragmentation, which is physically marked by the Brussels Canal that runs through 
the city (Dessouroux et al., 2016). Despite demographic growth, outmigration—related to the shortage of 
affordable, good-quality housing for low- and middle-income groups—remains an issue (Casier, 2019; De 
Laet, 2018). Homeownership (45% of the housing stock) and the private-rented sector are substantial, but 
public and regulated housing is scarce, representing less than 10% of the housing stock (De Decker, 2008; 
Dessouroux et al., 2016; Romainville, 2017). To tackle this problem, the regional development company 
(Citydev) offers subsidised homeownership for middle-income households, implemented through public–
private partnerships. This instrument is used to improve the attractiveness of the city, especially in the poor 
crescent of Brussels, the deprived neighbourhoods north and west of the city centre (Dessouroux et al., 
2016; Romainville, 2010). Although subsidised homeownership has been criticised for its lack of 
effectiveness (Dessouroux & Romainville, 2011), it remains one of the main instruments of housing supply 
and urban development. This tool is also used in live-work projects, in combination with economic and 
productive activities (see the Brussels projects).  
The current emphasis on the redevelopment of fragmented areas is the second main driver of the live-work 
mix in Brussels. The city has suffered from fragmented spatial planning, conflicting policies of various 
government agencies, institutional complexity related to the regional border and an inclination to serve 
market interests first (De Boeck et al., 2017; Groth & Corijn, 2005; Romanczyk, 2012). Brussels had no 
spatial planning policy until the 1960s when the land-use plan was introduced as the primary regulatory 
planning instrument (De Decker, 2008; Halleux et al., 2012). After a long period of urban decline, urban 
‘revitalisation’ policies were developed in the mid-1990s (Uitermark & Loopmans, 2013; Van Criekingen, 
2009), but these exacerbated socio-spatial polarisation and exclusion (Swyngedouw & Baeten, 2001). 
Currently, effective spatial planning is constrained by a lack of coordination with housing/infrastructure 
production, long-lasting developments and public support for opportunistic private investments (Ananian, 
2016). Brussels’ ambivalent position towards the market is partly due to land scarcity, which forces the 
region to collaborate with multiple stakeholders on large-scale developments (Bernard et al., 2009).  
Brussels’ regional development plan (Plan Régional de Développement Durable) promotes integrated economic 
growth through mixed-use development in targeted areas. The regional plan defines priority development 
sites, including a perimeter, the Stimulated Urban Economy Area (Zone d’Economie Urbaine Stimulée). This 
zone covers the Canal area and deprived neighbourhoods, where unemployment reaches 40% (De Boeck 
et al., 2017). The regional plan was influenced in part by changes in land-use regulations, which were revised 
in the context of a demographic boom. Housing was emphasised through the creation of a new mixed land-
use zone called the Enterprise Area for Urban Development (Zone d’Entreprises en Milieu Urbain [ZEMU]). 
The ZEMU opened former industrial areas to housing development and productive activities such as light 
industry, mainly in the Canal area. This land-use change was consistent with Brussels’ densification and 
economic strategies (Ananian, 2016). Economic growth legitimised the development of pilot mixed-use 
projects in these areas, mostly in partnership with the regional development company (ibid.). This actor 
combines responsibilities for economic expansion and urban revitalisation through subsidised housing and 
is central to the live-work mix in Brussels. 
4 Data and methods  
We selected three projects to explore the governance of live-work mix, one in Amsterdam and two in 
Brussels. The Amsterdam project (project AMS1) concerns the redevelopment of an obsolete office area 
constrained by existing ownership, which led to unusual governance arrangements. The two Brussels 
projects (project BXL1 and project BXL2) are pilot programmes, with a close mix of housing and productive 
activities in project BXL1, and a multi-purpose building in project BXL2. We visited each area and 
conducted 13 semi-structured in-depth interviews between February 2018 and 2019 (see Table 1 for the list 
of interviewees and their roles in the projects). Beginning with the development process, we asked the 
interviewees about their vision for the project, the main conflicts, compromises, interactions, biggest 
challenges and regulatory barriers. Although the relatively small sample of interviews limits generalisability, 
the choice of interviewees (each representing a different stakeholder) enabled us to discuss governance 
arrangements. We analysed the main instruments available for each project: local vision and strategies in 
Amsterdam, and local land-use plans and subdivision/building permits in Brussels. We used NVivo to 
perform qualitative coding of the research material and used these qualitative data to reconstruct the 
programme and development process of each project. This analysis helped us understand the decision-
making process throughout the developments. We presented the findings at feedback workshops (in January 
2019 in Amsterdam, and in November 2019 in Brussels), where the results were discussed and debated by 
civil servants and local experts. The workshops concerned a broader research project, but the participants 
discussed the main conclusions of this paper in small groups, where they could raise new issues and rectify 
certain observations. This critical feedback allowed us to sharpen our conclusions. 
  
Table 1. List of interviewees1. 
Amsterdam Brussels 
Investor AMS1 – Institutional investor, project manager 
of project AMS1 
Developer AMS1 – Developer of another plot in the sub-
area, project manager 
Urban planner AMS1 – Urban planner from the 
municipality supervising the area redevelopment 
Supervisor AMS1 – Government architect 
Architect AMS1 – Architect responsible for the design of 
project AMS1 
Process manager AMS1 – Consultant for the local vision 
Developer BXL1 – Developer, director 
Urban planner BXL1 – Head of the urban development 
department of the municipality 
Bouwmeester BXL1 – Project manager in the government 
architect’s team 
Architect BXL1 – Architect responsible for Phase 1 
Developer BXL2 – Developer, project manager 
Citydev BXL2 – Regional development company, project 
manager 
Architect BXL2 – Leading architect, project manager 
 
4.1 The project programmes  
Project AMS1 (2016–present, 28,500 m2) is part of the transformation of two office blocks (sub-area 
studied) in Amstel III, Amsterdam South-East (see Fig. 2). Redeveloping this area was complex because of 
the existing leasehold, which made the usual planning instruments unsuitable. Hence, the public and private 
actors co-wrote a local vision for the neighbourhood to provide guidelines for the redevelopment. Then, 
the municipality issued a development strategy for Amstel III and a development contract for each project. 
Project AMS1 consists of the demolition of an office building and the construction of two residential towers 
(274 dwellings) with a common ground floor (see Fig. 3). After negotiations about the requirements of the 
‘40/40/20’ policy, the tenure mix included 60% mid-rental housing but only 10% social housing. 
Commercial/office units and parking facilities are located on the lower floors.  
 
Fig. 1. Location of project AMS1, in Amstel III, Amsterdam South-East (map: www.maps.amsterdam.nl; diagram: authors). 
 
1 Six interviews were conducted in English, in February–March 2018 in Amsterdam, and seven interviews were conducted in French in January–
February 2019 in Brussels. 
All quotations for the Brussels case were translated from French to English. 
Urban planner BXL1 provided information on project BXL2 as well. 
  
Fig. 2. A rendering of project AMS1 (credit: OZ Architects) against the existing built environment (credit: authors). 
Project BXL1 (2010–2019, 39,300 m2 for Phase 1) consists of the construction of a seven-block district 
along the Canal in Anderlecht (see Fig. 4), a municipality of Brussels with an industrial past. The 
municipality started working on a local land-use plan for this area before regional land-use regulation opened 
the area to housing development. The first phase (see Fig. 5, left panel) combines elderly housing, 95 owner-
occupied dwellings and business-to-business services. Before the local land-use plan was adopted, a 
thorough revision of the project was conducted to obtain planning permission. All remaining blocks were 
subject to a subdivision permit. The second phase (41,300 m2) includes subsidised housing (181 dwellings 
in total) and productive activities. The last four blocks should deliver more productive activities and public 
facilities. Public competitions were planned for these blocks, with the support of the government architect.  
Project BXL2 (2014–2022, 24,300 m2) is located in a highly mixed area near project BXL1. The 
development (see Fig. 5, right panel) is the result of an architectural competition organised by the regional 
development company, which had previously applied for a subdivision permit. The development includes 
103 subsidised housing units, various facilities and a multi-purpose building (Bâtiment à Affectations Multiples). 
The latter building must include a certain proportion of productive activities, services and housing, the 
distribution of which can be adapted over time. The first scenario for the multi-purpose building was 
determined before the permit request, and the design was adapted accordingly. 
 
Fig. 3. Location of projects BXL1–2 along the Canal in Anderlecht (map: urbisonline.brussels; diagram: authors). 
  
Fig. 4. View of Phase 1 completed (credit: authors) and rendering of project BXL2 (credit: A2M). 
5 Live-work development in targeted areas  
In this section, we present the results of the analysis of the three live-work projects by city. The key findings 
are summarised in Table 2, together with the main features of each city’s institutional framework.  
5.1 Transforming an office area in Amsterdam  
We observed state support for live-work mix in project AMS1, but with limited governance capacity because 
the municipality’s steering capacity has decreased since the 1990s and even further after the real estate crisis 
that followed the 2008 financial crisis (Savini, 2016). The existing ownership structure further reduced this 
capacity, prompting the municipality to develop new roles to attract market parties and accelerate the 
transformation of the area. The municipality showed greater flexibility on specific requirements:  
It’s very important to get started in this area, instead of thinking of all those features you have to take into 
place because this area won’t be transformed if you put all the levels of things you have to comply to … that, 
it won’t happen over here. They [the municipality] realised it. Because they tried for ten years to make 
something else from this area and it never …nothing happened. [Investor AMS1; emphasis added]  
These comments reflect the stimulating and facilitating roles the municipality assigned to itself in the strategic 
vision for Amstel III (see below). The municipality outlined this strategy but was reported as behind market 
in the definition of the local vision for the sub-area (Project Manager AMS1). The municipality had to 
balance its long-term goals with the market’s willingness to fulfil them (Urban planner AMS1). A recent 
actor in Amsterdam’s spatial planning community, the government architect (Supervisor architectuur en 
stedenbouw), supervised the spatial quality of the developments during the design phase and paid particular 
attention to density and mixed-use design (Supervisor AMS1). The government architect’s role goes beyond 
the usual regulatory role of planning authorities and emphasises design-oriented planning. The market was 
reluctant to adopt live-work mix and instead opportunistically maximised residential density. The developers 
justified the high-density choice by regarding themselves as ‘pioneers’ in the area. Cost efficiency further 
influenced the market’s decision to demolish as opposed to convert the existing office buildings. However, 
the recovery of the office market after the real estate crisis and the renewed demand for offices created 
competition between housing and offices. Despite a strong housing market, the impact of each function on 
land-lease prices disturbed market choices for the development programmes (Developer AMS1). 
Nevertheless, for the studied plot, the investor strategically focused on its core business activity, mid-rental 
housing.  
We examined the new instruments used in the planning process from the area to the plot level. The 
Development Strategy (Ontwikkelstrategie Amstel III, December 2017) sets goals for Amstel III. This legally 
binding document acknowledges the need for the municipality to collaborate closely with landlords, 
investors and developers without making new plans. The explicit mention of increased market responsibility 
illustrates the emphasis on market interests. The programmatic vision (included in the tool) offers a long-
term framework and specifies that the municipality is alternately required to play facilitating, stimulating and 
guiding roles. This document also lists goals to densify the area through housing development and offer 
workplaces that are adapted to the ‘urban knowledge economy’ to transform Amstel III into an attractive 
living-working city district. Somewhat uncommonly, the local vision for the development strategy. The 
vision formalised common goals and intentions for several topics, including the proportion of amenities 
and non-residential functions. The balance between guidelines and rules in the document was instrumental 
to the market’s commitment:  
So, you could say it’s a new way of master planning, it’s not a master plan saying: ‘Ok, everything is fixed.’ 
No, you try to make a set of rules that make sure that you will not stop the energy of this market party that 
really wants to start. It’s just … What do you really need to fix, and what can be open for a market to fill? 
[Project Manager AMS1]  
The local vision was the main consensus instrument. It is a non-legally binding political agreement (Savini, 
2016) that was co-authored by public and private parties with the support of external consultants. The vision 
helped the municipality bind small- and large-scale instruments, i.e. development contracts and the 
subsequent development strategy. According to Developer AMS1, helping define the vision made him feel 
more committed to transforming the area. Nevertheless, the local vision turned out to be too flexible for 
the rigid land-lease system. Although the land-lease system originally made it difficult to change rights, the 
local vision lacked prescriptive rules to ensure the implementation of live-work goals. At the plot level, in 
the absence of a tendering process before the developments, the market and municipality entered into 
development contracts (Kavelpasspoort, 2018). Each contract consisted of a private mutual agreement about 
specific rules, including negotiations regarding the functions allowed. In the Netherlands, development 
contracts have been used increasingly in land-use change situations to enhance certainty, mitigate 
opportunistic behaviours and facilitate adaptability (Savini, 2016; van den Hurk & Tasan-Kok, 2020).  
The consensus-building process relied on the ‘we need them, and they need us’ rationale. Despite the complex 
transformation process, there was consensus on mixed-use objectives. The situation brought all parties 
together in a new form of governance that different interviewees variously named ‘light urbanism’, ‘organic 
development’ or ‘co-creation’. In the literature, such governance is built on consensus, and the active 
involvement of the market is referred to as ‘entrepreneurial’ (Tasan-Kok, 2010), ‘collaborative’ (Healey, 
1997) or ‘strategic’ (Albrechts, 2004). Because the market parties were aware that they were needed to initiate 
the area’s transformation, they knew they were in a steering position. Two consultants helped the partners 
define their shared vision by acting as intermediaries between the actors. We gathered the thoughts of a few 
actors to illustrate this collaborative effort:  
We were searching together to get a certain output that could be sufficient enough for the market to move 
forward and wouldn’t be too strict for the municipality to not fit in their bigger structure. [Project Manager 
AMS1]  
What we’re trying to do is to minimise the amount of rules, so we can still control things are going right. So, 
it’s always the balance: what kind of rules do we put up, and what kind of freedom do we give to the market? 
(…) Within the process, we are trying to seduce them to make good plans together. (…) It’s always this balance, 
in our ambition: what we want, and what’s still feasible out of the developer. [Urban planner AMS1]  
We tried to, as in a pioneers’ phase, to really understand each other and to make a plan together, which has 
eventually become the Buurtvisie, in which we made spatial agreements or rules, and also we talked about these 
topics, how to bring it further in the next phase, which we are actually in now. [Investor AMS1]  
However, the consensus-building process was affected by the need to find a compromise between ensuring 
the pioneers’ commitment and preserving the long-term vision, which led the municipality to modify its 
goals:  
In a way, we are happy with…that something is already happening there. And it’s a very good… the quality 
of the building is ok, the programme is ok, it’s not spectacular, it’s not very high on ambition, but what do 
you expect within this area for the first project? [Urban planner AMS1]  
Hence, the tenure mix was negotiated for each development and formalised in the development contract. 
The negotiation enabled the market to target primarily young, middle-class and expatriate residents and 
reduces the chances that the municipality will achieve its tenure mix goals.  
5.2 Regenerating an industrial area in Brussels  
In the two Brussels’ projects, state support for live-work mix was conspicuous in the active roles of new 
actors. The three key actors advocating for live-work mix were the regional development company, the 
Canal team and the government architect, and they compensated for the Anderlecht municipality’s 
weaknesses. Limited by institutional complexity and a lack of resources, the municipality had to use indirect 
value-capturing instruments and demand public facilities (e.g. a preschool in project BXL2) from the 
developers before the projects could proceed. The municipality also supported owner-occupied housing 
and saw the existing, well-anchored industry in the area as a barrier to attracting potential homeowners (De 
Boeck et al., 2017). Although the municipality was behind the regional institutions in the process for project 
BXL1, it had a steering role in project BXL2. The regional development company played an entrepreneurial role 
in initiating the multiple-purpose-building concept (project BXL2), confirming its ability to innovate live-
work concepts:  
It’s a pilot project that we are developing here. So, we don’t really know if it is going to work and if it will bear 
fruit. Because, mixed-use, having a workshop close to housing, is it something that can exist? We tend to take 
for granted that it cannot exist, but well, it demands another reflection, as a matter of fact. It requires to design 
projects in another way. [Citydev BXL2; emphasis added]  
The Canal team (second key actor) was created to implement the Canal plan and foster collaboration 
between regional institutions (De Boeck et al., 2017). In project BXL1 (Phase 2), the Canal team made it 
possible for all regional institutions to speak with one voice in front of the developer (Bouwmeester BXL1). 
The team also defended a certain vision for live-work mix that smoothly integrated productive activities. 
The government architect (Bouwmeester) is in the Canal team, but his primary roles are to oversee the spatial 
quality of new developments (as in Amsterdam) and organise architectural competitions. The current 
government architect also emphasises the development of productive activities, such as fablabs and 
craftsmanship, based on a ‘productive-city’ discourse (De Boeck et al., 2017). For project BXL1, the 
government architect reviewed local planning instruments and the design of Phase 2. Nonetheless, this 
phase was adapted with only marginal changes. Again, the active role of the government architect in the 
design illustrates a case of design-oriented planning.  
The market played an opportunistic role in the projects by focusing on its core business, at the expense of 
productive activities. The developers were hardly confident in the commercialisation of a function with 
which they had little experience:  
It is a challenge to commercialise housing above productive activities. We’re going to have questions; we are 
only about to start. We’re going to have questions on ‘yes, but, what are we going to have behind us, are we 
not going to have some’ … It’s clearly not as simple as if it was a small shop or if it was … You see, it’s not 
… it’s still a challenge. [Developer BXL1]  
Nevertheless, developing subsidised housing dwellings with a standardised programme allowed for the 
derisking of the developments to a certain extent, especially since the regional development company holds 
applications to purchase dwellings. The developers still negotiated the possibility of delivering relatively 
high-density housing. Moreover, in project BXL1, the new land-use regulation was captured by the market 
to develop housing and offices primarily (in Phase 1). Thus, productive activities were jeopardised because 
of competition with other functions and uncertainty about the future property management of these spaces. 
Except for the subsidised dwellings, the developers had the authority to determine the target buyers (young 
couples and families) as long as they respected the municipality’s request for mixed dwelling types (Urban 
planner BXL2).  
The only new instrument in both projects was the Canal plan (2013), which was made to assess the area, draw 
flexible guidelines and unite the actors (including the public sector actors) about these principles. This 
strategic instrument illustrates incremental planning based on case-by-case solutions and soft rules, i.e. 
planning advocating incrementalism, mutual adjustment and negotiations in decision-making (Healey, 
1997). Most importantly, the revision of land-use regulations and the strategic use of the local land-use plan 
(Plan particulier d’affectation du sol) made live-work mix possible in project BXL1. The local land-use plan was 
used to enhance the residential attractiveness of the area and provide for the development of productive 
activities. However, the period between design and implementation (2010–2017) weakened the instrument. 
Finally, both projects used the subdivision permit, a mainstream regulatory instrument based on a 
masterplan defining functions, volumes and densities. In project BXL2, the subdivision permit (2016) 
framed the programme for the multiple-purpose building and was used for the architectural competition 
(2017). This choice of instrument was criticised for being unsuitable for such a flexible and adaptive 
programme:  
It was not mandatory, but these are the regional authorities who imposed it on us, to do a subdivision permit. 
But it is one block, actually. One could wonder whether it was useful or not, to limit architectural creativity 
in one block (…). The problem of a subdivision permit is that we state in the requirements that the proposals 
must respect the framework of the permit. (…) Once I saw the proposals, I figured out that this inhibits 
architects’ creativity because I think they can come up with innovative solutions and the permit is a barrier, 
in this framework. [Citydev BXL2]  
The subdivision permit (2018) for project BXL1 was conceived after the development of Phase 1 as a more 
precise complement to the local land-use plan.  
We also observed conflicting uses of instruments that created lock-in effects. For example, the municipal 
authorities considered Phase 1 in project BXL1 a failure because planning permission was obtained before 
the local land-use plan was adopted. The municipal authorities felt ‘trapped’ (Urban Planner BXL1) by a 
process that they believed occurred too quickly under pressure from the developer. Indeed, market pressure 
tends to impede Brussels’ spatial planning (Romanczyk, 2012). In project BXL2, inflexible building 
regulations hampered the inclusion of the multiple-purpose-building concept in the subdivision permit. The 
building permit procedure requires that the initial scenario be both compliant to the subdivision permit and 
financially feasible. Technical and regulatory issues thus limit the scope of possibilities. Such a limitation is 
a barrier to the adaptability-over-time rationale, especially as another permit would be necessary to change 
the functions in the project.  
Consensus-building was fostered by aspects of the projects that created interdependencies among the actors. 
The location was of interest to all actors because it was a large-scale, well-connected site that was available 
and affordable. These site characteristics attracted public and private investment, elicited greater 
acceptability of the projects from local authorities and created interdependencies between public and private 
actors, as well as within the public sector. In project BXL1, Phase 2, the Canal team led the collaborative 
process to improve communication between the planning authorities and the developer (Bouwmeester 
BXL1). Nevertheless, the institutional complexity of the public sector negatively impacted the decision-
making processes in both projects, hindering clear communication of the actors’ respective visions for the 
projects and creating tensions during the negotiations. For example, we noticed discrepancies among visions 
for the live-work mix. Such differences were assumed to be related to the actors’ misperceptions about what 
constitutes productive activities. Developer BXL1 considered the emphasis on productive activities to be 
symptomatic of a nostalgic vision of the city, perhaps because he had an outdated vision of urban industry:  
When it comes to mixed-use, we truly believe it’s an added value. But it’s perhaps more complicated with 
productive activities than originally imagined. Because originally, I think it’s much more ambitious to really 
keep industry. And for this, well, we are more lukewarm. One cannot mix any type of industry with housing. 
[Developer BXL1]  
A clearer definition of this function would have improved the consensus-building process. 
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6 Discussion and conclusion  
This paper addresses governance arrangements that are used to implement live-work goals in contrasting 
institutional frameworks. Because live-work mix can both support economic development and enhance 
residential attractiveness, it has been increasingly advocated in urban agendas. The empirical research 
presented here regarding live-work projects in targeted areas of Amsterdam and Brussels indicates that live-
work development has taken different paths in these cities. Such divergences reflect discrepancies in the 
overall visions of live-work mix, and more specifically, in what the ‘live’ and ‘work’ components ought to 
be. Amsterdam promotes mid-rental housing and working- living milieus that rely on a knowledge-city 
discourse, whereas Brussels emphasises subsidised homeownership and productive activities based on a 
productive-city discourse. However, our analysis of the live-work projects found similar governance 
arrangements that enabled the actors to manage complex situations throughout the planning process, e.g. 
with unusual joint property arrangements in Brussels and existing leaseholds in Amsterdam.  
State support is an essential component of live-work development. However, the types of actors involved 
and the roles that they play vary between the cities. In the projects we examined, the Amsterdam 
municipality assumed an unusually facilitating role, given its reduced steering capacity, and in Brussels, new 
actors were key to the developments. The Canal team improved the collective governance capacity of the 
regional institutions while the regional development company played an entrepreneurial role. Both cities 
benefitted from an actor dedicated to spatial quality, the government architect, which confirms the need for 
design-oriented planning and the importance of high-quality design in live-work projects (Grant & Perrott, 
2011). The local variations in state roles illustrated discrepancies in planning regimes. The fragmentation in 
Brussels required new government agencies to improve its governance capacity. In contrast, Amsterdam 
still centralises its resources, although it has increasingly been assisted by external consultants. In both cases, 
these cities used actors as ‘innovation intermediaries’ to facilitate innovation and interactions among 
mainstream actors (Nyström et al., 2014).  
Conversely, the market remains reluctant to develop live-work mix. Investors and developers are still 
primarily interested in the ‘live’ component of live-work mix. Analysis of the Amsterdam project showed 
an opportunistic market focused on cost efficiency and ‘easy’ target groups that are likely to settle in an area 
as pioneer residents (Hochstenbach & Boterman, 2015). In Brussels, the market acted similarly and was able 
to mitigate risks by developing subsidised housing and offices rather than productive activities. Interestingly, 
no social housing providers were involved in any of the projects examined. Further research would be 
required to understand to what extent the shared interest of the state and the market for demographics that 
they consider as ‘attractive’ (e.g. young, middle class) may have influenced the absence of collaboration with 
a social housing provider. Not collaborating with this type of actor might lead to overlooking lower-income 
households. Studying further the societal impact of such collaboration would thus be relevant.  
The planning instruments used in the projects examined in this study captured the difficult balance between 
strategy and regulation. Traditional planning instruments and regulations often constrain live-work goals. 
Hence, the actors established (and in some cases, co-authored) custom-made planning instruments 
consisting of local visions and used existing instruments strategically (e.g. the development contract in 
Amsterdam or the subdivision permit in Brussels) to enhance both flexibility and predictability. The choice 
of these instruments illustrates variants of strategic planning in the two cities–contract planning in 
Amsterdam and incremental planning in Brussels–that are consistent with their respective city planning 
systems. However, these instruments conflicted with existing regulations (e.g. land-lease contract, planning 
permission), which constrained the implementation of the projects.  
Despite these planning weaknesses, early-stage collaboration triggered consensus-building in live-work 
development. We observed a shared interest in enhancing the residential attractiveness of the locations (an 
obsolete office area in Amsterdam and an industrial deprived area in Brussels). Such an interest legitimised 
the focus of the market on delivering housing for middle-income households in each city, although with 
different tenure forms, under the influence of each city’s past welfare state regime. Such decisions, as well 
as higher-density living, were supported by the ‘pioneer’ nature of the projects in the redevelopment of 
these areas and generated interdependencies, such as the ‘we need them, and they need us’ discourse in 
Amsterdam. However, discrepancies on the nature of live-work mix affected the planning process, with 
competition between functions in Amsterdam and misperceptions of the productive activities to be 
delivered in Brussels. We observed different collaborative arrangements in the two cities, each with its 
limitations. These arrangements suffered from the search for a balance between market commitment and 
state vision in Amsterdam and were affected by institutional complexity in Brussels. Although previous 
research may have assumed that it is easier to balance public and private interests in the Netherlands than 
in Belgium (Tasan-Kok, 2010), our results show that this does not especially appear to be the case for live-
work projects. Both cities experienced specific difficulties that led to similar struggles in trying to balance 
market interests and achieve ‘effective spatial planning’ (Remøy & Street, 2018).  
Although our comparative case study approach confirmed that live-work mix has strong local ties and 
requires adapted solutions, it also shed light on the emergence of unusual governance arrangements and 
unexpected governance capacities that led to innovative practices. More in-depth research could investigate 
the tendency for live-work mix to be coupled with high-density living in areas with no housing, as well as 
the liveability of these urban districts in the making. Investigations of the property management of live-
work buildings also seem necessary, given the uncertainties we observed, e.g. in the operation of industrial 
workshops in Brussels due to the absence of dedicated actors. Such uncertainties threaten the planning 
process, especially in vertical mix situations (Mualam et al., 2019). Nevertheless, by investigating the 
implementation process of live-work mix in different institutional frameworks, this paper enhances 
knowledge about new actors and instruments that will be increasingly involved in future planning systems, 
given the likely increase of live-work mix in cities. 
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